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ANTITRUST AND THE MOVEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
INTRODUCTION 
Determining the proper role of antitrust in high-technology markets is 
daunting for a number of reasons. First, the antitrust statutes provide little 
help. They identify restraints of trade, monopolization, or practices that 
may lessen competition in only the most general terms.1 The Sherman and 
Clayton Acts do not refer to high technology, innovation, or even intellec-
tual property law except for a single reference to patented goods in Section 
3 of the Clayton Act.2 Neither do the statutes exclude them, however, and 
few people believe that antitrust should have no place in the formation of 
policy for high-technology markets.3  
Second is the problem of interaction between antitrust and intellectual 
property law, particularly patent law, which has always presented difficult 
problems of boundary management. By and large, high-technology markets 
are also IP-intensive markets, although some of them, such as information 
technologies, are also markets where the patent system often lets us down.4 
Indeed, today there are good reasons for thinking that antitrust is doing a 
better job within its domain than much of intellectual property law is doing 
in its.5 
Antitrust’s duty is not to increase rivalry for its own sake, but rather to 
encourage market behavior that will increase economic welfare. Problemat-
ically, the effects produced by innovation and those produced by competi-
tion in price and quantity often pull against each other. Antitrust is general-
ly dedicated to incentivizing competitive output and pricing, which are 
mainly short-run concerns. By contrast, intellectual property policy awards 
above-cost returns in order to provide incentives to innovate, an essentially 
long-run concern. 
Another important difference is that innovation is so badly behaved 
when compared to the relatively smooth transitions that traditional price 
theory finds for competitive processes under constant technology. Firms 
  
 * Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Chair Professor of Law and History, University of Iowa College of 
Law. 
 1 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, 13-14 (2006).  
 2 Id. § 14. 
 3 See id. §§ 1-2, 13-14.  
 4 See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: 
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 104, 106 (2012). 
 5 Id. at 33-35, 38-39. 
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build plants and capacity goes up, so prices go down. New firms enter or 
existing firms exit, and prices decline or increase accordingly. Indeed, the 
entire notion of equilibrium in neoclassical economics presupposes relative-
ly smooth flowing responses from output to price, or vice versa. 
In sharp contrast, innovation often produces very sudden and quite un-
predictable results. It can completely kill an industry in a few years, as elec-
tronic calculators did to slide rules in the 1960s. In the process, it can bring 
an entirely new industry into existence in an equally short time.6 It can pro-
duce results far different than researchers expected, such as the blockbuster 
drug Viagra, which was the culmination of a research project seeking a 
treatment for angina, not for erectile dysfunction.7 Innovation can produce 
sudden and dramatic shifts in prices or output and almost instantly expand 
the range of consumer choices. As a result, predicting and managing com-
petitive processes in highly innovative industries is much more difficult 
than in markets where technology is very largely constant and most move-
ments affect only the output and price of a set of unchanging products. 
Another challenge to antitrust in high-technology markets is that so 
much of innovation is nonrivalrous. On the supply side, one person’s con-
sumption of it does not deplete the amount that is left for others. This fact 
entails a significantly stronger role for collaboration in innovation, but it 
also produces other consequences. One is that restraints on output are more 
suspicious in IP collaborations than in more traditional production joint 
ventures.8 Another is that dominant firms or groups of firms often have 
incentives to engage in practices that restrain rather than promote innova-
tion.9 
Yet another feature that makes innovation complex is that strong IP 
rights can make output much “lumpier” than it is in traditional markets. In 
markets for manufactured products without significant IP protection, high 
price-cost margins induce new entry and the resulting increase in output 
brings prices down toward the competitive level. The new entry may be 
costly, but it will occur if anticipated payoffs justify the risk and expense. 
For example, if incumbent firms operate cement plants with public domain 
technology, new entrants can copy the structures of existing firms. While 
entry is costly, it will typically occur up to the point that anticipated post-
entry prices drop to cost. Indeed, competitiveness in the neoclassical sense 
depends on the ability of new entrants to copy the production of incum-
bents. The model of perfect competition, which presupposes fungible prod-
ucts, also presupposes copying. 
  
 6 See id. at 240-41. 
 7 See MEIKA LOE, THE RISE OF VIAGRA: HOW THE LITTLE BLUE PILL CHANGED SEX IN AMERICA 
41-42 (2004). 
 8 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 9 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 238, 240, 244-47, 250. 
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Intellectual property rights often do not behave in such a continuous 
fashion. In the absence of IP protection, copying is often quick and cheap, 
leading to the virtually instantaneous movement of prices to short-run mar-
ginal cost, with insufficient return to justify the innovation investment. This 
is strongly true for such things as digital media, but it can also be true for 
many process patents. By contrast, when a strong IP right is recognized, 
copying may simply become unlawful, foreclosing competitive entry at any 
price. Of course, in the real world we rarely see such all-or-nothing results 
for two reasons. First, few IP rights are so strong that they foreclose every 
possible entry alternative. Instead, we typically see the emergence of prod-
uct-differentiated markets. Second, licensing can facilitate entry, and today 
a great deal of technology is licensed to competitors. Universal cross licens-
ing of the technology for making a fungible product could yield something 
very close to perfect competition, depending on license terms.10 By contrast, 
universal refusal to license would produce monopoly in a few extreme cas-
es, but mainly it would produce differentiation and a fairly substantial 
amount of monopolistic competition among rivals.11 
Antitrust has relatively little to say about the ways in which technolo-
gy is initially created, whether by patent, copyright, trade secret, or simply 
first-mover advantages. Even the patentee who defrauds the patent office in 
order to obtain its patent does not generally violate the antitrust laws simply 
by getting the patent. In general, patents are characterized by a great deal of 
government agency supervision during the patent-granting process, but 
almost no supervision once the patent has been granted.  
An antitrust offense, if any, almost always lies in post-issuance collab-
orations or in the use of patents to restrict market entry.12 That is, antitrust 
has a much bigger role to play in decisions about how intellectual property, 
once acquired, moves or fails to move from one firm to another. Both li-
censing and refusals to license have produced large amounts of antitrust 
doctrine. Historically, a great deal of this doctrine was implicitly based on 
models of price competition that did a very poor job of taking the compli-
cating factors produced by innovation and intellectual property rights into 
account.13 Antitrust challenges to licensing among competitors have been 
concerned primarily with various forms of collusion or boycott. Practices 
concerning refusals to license are concerned mainly with anticompetitive 
  
 10 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 46-48. 
 11 See discussion infra Part II. 
 12 See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174, 177 
(1965) (noting that infringement action based on fraudulently obtained patent could violate the antitrust 
laws). On the full range of Walker Process claims, see 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 706 (3d ed. 2008). 
 13 See ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS vii, 7-11 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. 
Teece eds., 1992). 
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exclusion. The balance of this Article addresses antitrust concerns in these 
two very broad areas. 
Part I of this Article discusses collaborative development of technolo-
gy and the idea of the IP commons. It continues by addressing output and 
access restrictions in the commons as well as the issue of pooling worthless 
patents. Part I concludes with a discussion of tying and foreclosure with 
respect to pooled patents. Part II discusses the no-duty-to-share principle in 
patent law and offers solutions meant to facilitate innovative competition. 
I. COLLABORATIVE PRODUCTION AND THE INNOVATION COMMONS 
Intellectual property rights create strong incentives for collaborative 
development. IP rights are nonrivalrous, which means that at the production 
end, one firm’s use does not deplete the amount left over for others. This 
stands in sharp contrast to the collaborative production of rivalrous goods, 
such as oil and gas or fish, where the incentive to overuse is both strong and 
damaging to the supply of the right-producing asset. The principal hin-
drance to collaborative development of rivalrous goods is that collaboration 
tends to sever the link between investment and appropriation. To the extent 
that people’s ability to take out is not related to the amount they put in, we 
will see overproduction. For example, unrestrained fishermen on a common 
pond will spend too many resources taking fish out and too few on restock-
ing and management.14 For this reason, a relatively small amount of tradi-
tional production is organized as commons. Most firms own the means of 
production exclusively, and their ability to produce depends entirely on 
their own willingness to invest.15 
Collaborative development and licensing of technology is encouraged 
by a number of interrelated phenomena. First, for many technologies, fixed 
costs are extremely high in relation to variable costs. Once technology is 
developed, it can be used an infinite number of times without depleting 
what is left over. That is to say, the same factors that make intellectual 
property nonrivalrous across two or more economic persons also provide 
significant returns to scale for research and development (“R&D”). As a 
result, technology sharing very significantly reduces costs. The high-risk 
nature of many innovation programs serves to magnify this effect, because 
firms that share the costs of innovation can more easily absorb the costs of 
failure. For example, if a single firm launches a $100 million research effort 
to develop a new flat panel display screen, it must bear the entire loss if the 
venture fails to produce a marketable product. If five firms jointly launch or 
finance the same effort, however, each one will assume only one-fifth of the 
  
 14 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354 
(1967). 
 15 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 327-31. 
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cost of failure. Further, if the venture succeeds in producing a patentable 
product, each firm can produce all it wants. How much each firm produces 
will depend on competitive market demand, or else on any output re-
striction that the firms might employ, either expressly in their license 
agreement or else through express or tacit collusion on the side. In sum, 
significant cost savings can accrue to collaborating firms, both if the ven-
ture fails and if it succeeds. 
A second feature of technology that encourages collaborative devel-
opment is the need for interoperability or common standards. A hallmark of 
a great deal of innovation is networking and interconnectivity. Products 
must be designed in such a way that they can interconnect with one another, 
or else they must be compatible with a common set of inputs. Compatibility 
usually does not happen by itself; it must be achieved. This can happen in a 
number of ways. For example, firms might independently develop incom-
patible products and then fight with one another for competitive acceptance. 
A prominent example from the nineteenth century was the dispute over 
railroad track gauges, which finally came to an end when the United States 
began chartering transcontinental railroads and insisted on a standard 
gauge.16 This was also true of the war over VHS and Betamax as videotape 
formats in the 1980s, and also of the more recent fight between Blu-ray and 
HD DVD.17 In each case, rival firms developed alternative formats and 
fought for consumer acceptance.18 Alternatively, firms might collaborate in 
advance on a single format, thus saving the cost of multiple development, 
although doing so would mean giving up some of the competitive trial and 
error by which markets identify preferred products. 
A networked world need not be a world of monopolists. Multiple firms 
provide many large networks, firms that both compete with each other and 
offer complementary products. This is true of telecommunications, the In-
ternet, electronic banking and credit card services, electricity, and natural 
gas.19 But networks can function only if the firms share common standards 
for products and systems, and typically these standards result from collabo-
ration of firms that show up in the market as competitors. The collabora-
tions promise considerable social gain, but they also raise the potential for 
competitive harm in either of two ways. First, the firms might fix output or 
price unreasonably, perhaps using exclusion devices as a facilitator. Se-
cond, they might channel or restrain innovation unreasonably. That is to 
  
 16 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 284 
(2005). 
 17 BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 358. 
 18 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 279-80 (discussing the battle for market dominance be-
tween VHS and Sony, which produced Betamax video recorders and tapes).  
 19 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 285-89 (2006). On telecommunications networks, see DANIEL F. SPULBER & 
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, NETWORKS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ECONOMICS AND LAW 15 (2009). 
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say, networks can create positive externalities that require some deference,20 
or market two-sidedness that can complicate analysis of pricing and out-
put.21 But these are qualifications to the way that antitrust should be applied 
rather than indicators that antitrust is useless in networked markets.22 
Agreements facilitating collaborative innovation can also facilitate col-
laborative restraints on output or price. To be sure, there is no necessary 
link. Agreements for joint R&D or standard setting define a set of inputs, 
while price or quantity limitations or territorial or product market divisions 
are restraints on output. For example, the fact that a group of automobile 
manufacturers have developed an emission control system jointly does not 
entail that they must agree on how many units each participant will produce 
or what price it will charge. Unrestrained, each could produce as many cars 
with the new system as they wished, right up to the competitive level of 
output. 
The task that antitrust policy confronts is to permit collaboration to 
achieve the cost savings and interoperability that collaborative innovation 
promises, while searching out and policing restrictions on output or price 
that are both competitively harmful and unnecessary to achieve these goals, 
or that restrain the legitimate innovations of rivals. 
A. Antitrust Policy on the IP Commons 
A commons is a resource that is used most effectively when it is 
shared. Traditional commons include such things as fishing, grazing, or 
water rights, or underground pools of oil or natural gas that have multiple 
surface owners.23 Commons production is preferred either because signifi-
cant scale economies accrue to joint development or else because the cost 
of sharing is lower than the cost of identifying and defending individual 
boundaries. Traditional commons are rivalrous, meaning that use by one 
person takes away from the amount that is left over for others—a common 
characteristic of individually held property rights. For example, if ten 
ranchers share grazing rights in a certain pasture, each additional cow takes 
away grass that would otherwise be available to someone else. As a result, 
the ranchers will almost certainly have to agree about how many cattle each 
rancher can graze on the commons. Overuse depletes the supply.  
  
 20 See, e.g., George L. Priest, Rethinking Antitrust Law in an Age of Network Industries 2-3 (John 
M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 352, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1031166. 
 21 See, e.g., David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE 
J. ON REG. 325, 325-26 (2003). 
 22 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 299-319. 
 23 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 61-67 (1990) (describing the tradition of common grazing grounds in Switzerland 
and Japan). 
2012] ANTITRUST AND THE MOVEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY 1125 
In contrast to traditional commons, intellectual property commons are 
almost always nonrivalrous on the supply side. If ten producers own the 
rights to make a product covered by a patent, each one can make as many 
units as it pleases without limiting the number that others can make.24 If the 
ten producers are acting competitively and producing a commodity, they 
will increase production all the way to the competitive level. Considered ex 
post, that might seem to be a good thing, but considered ex ante it may not 
give the producers the correct incentive to develop the patented technology 
in the first place. That is, the costs of innovating the product are fixed and 
may not be reflected in a competitive post-innovation regime in which pric-
es are driven to short-run costs. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that output restrictions perform a differ-
ent function in nonrivalrous commons from the one that they perform in a 
rivalrous commons. In a rivalrous commons for, say, fishing rights, catch 
limits are necessary to prevent individual overfishing. Otherwise, each par-
ticipant will have an incentive to take out as much as possible, leaving oth-
ers to bear the expense of restocking and maintenance. As a result, there is 
nothing suspicious about a commons management rule that limits individu-
al fishermen to, say, one hundred of a particular species per day. 
But the patent pool has no close equivalent of overfishing on the sup-
ply side, because the supply is infinite. Rather, the problem is congestion 
externalities on the output side, or the possibility of overproduction in rela-
tion to fixed costs. Perhaps Justice Story realized this in Brooks v. Byam,25 
when he ordered a group of persons who collectively owned rights in a pa-
tent for friction matches to engage in joint production.26 However, the six-
teenth century common law decision he relied on, Lord Mountjoy’s Case,27 
involved rivalrous goods.28 
Fundamentally, the rationale for innovation commons, such as patent 
pooling, is no different than the rationale for the pooling of rivalrous goods, 
such as fishing or grazing rights. The rationale is the same one that applies 
to the structure of firms generally. In his well-known 1937 article on The 
Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase argued that the boundaries of a firm lie 
along the line where the cost of internal production is just equal to the cost 
of market procurement.29 If it is cheaper to purchase something than to 
make that thing for oneself, the firm will buy.30 If self-production is cheaper 
  
 24 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY, ch. 9, at 29 (2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1952091.  
 25 4 F. Cas. 261 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 1,948). 
 26 Id. at 271. 
 27 (1582) 78 Eng. Rep. 11 (K.B.). 
 28 HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 4. 
 29 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 394-95 (1937); see also Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 88 IND. L.J. 499, 529 
(2011). 
 30 See Coase, supra note 29, at 394-95.  
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or produces better results, it will make.31 The sum of all of these decisions 
defines the boundaries of the firm and, coordinately, of the market in which 
the firm procures inputs from other firms. That is, a market is a group of 
firms that each face lower costs when trading inside than when going out-
side.32 
The decision to share a productive asset such as a fishery or a patent 
rests on the same principles. Individual ownership has costs—namely, the 
costs of identifying and enforcing individual boundaries. Collective owner-
ship also has costs—namely, the costs of bringing investment and produc-
tion incentives into alignment as they would be under individual ownership. 
If boundaries are unambiguous and relatively cheap to defend, as they are 
in most cases involving tangible property, the incentive effects of individual 
ownership make it more profitable in most cases. As boundaries become 
more difficult to locate or the costs of defending them increase, however, 
the costs of coordinating investment and production on a commons may 
make it an attractive alternative. Fishing on a public or commonly owned 
pool is an obvious example because fish are mobile and the cost of placing 
and maintaining effective underwater boundaries is extremely high. A more 
profitable solution is for the fishermen with access rights to develop a re-
gime in which both the number of fish taken out and the amount invested in 
restocking and development emulate what a single firm would do. The 
commons manager can then develop individual catch and contribution rules 
that divide these entitlements and obligations among the participants. 
Because these decisions are based on the costs of supplying a particu-
lar asset, outcomes will range widely from one market to another. Further, 
commons management within a market will be effective for some assets but 
not for others. For example, ownership and maintenance of fishing boats do 
not encounter the same boundary problems that pertain to the fish them-
selves. As a result, one would expect to see a form of industrial organiza-
tion evolve in which fishermen entrepreneurs owned and maintained their 
boats individually but did their fishing in a common pool. 
Owners of intellectual property rights organize them into commons for 
several reasons. First, the fact that IP rights are not common pool resources 
in the traditional sense but are nonrivalrous goods serves to make manage-
ment as a commons easier. The manager need not be concerned about ex-
hausting the supply. 
Second, such rights are often subject to very low marginal cost and 
significant economies of scale. Once a new patented technology is devel-
oped it can be used an infinite number of times, which means that econo-
mies of scale in the technology itself may far exceed economies of scale in 
physical production or distribution. For example, if an R&D project result-
  
 31 Id. at 394. 
 32 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coasean Markets, 31 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 63, 64 (2011), available at 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/65031035h363g164/fulltext.pdf. 
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ing in patents for a certain technology cost $10 million to develop, these 
costs amortized over 100,000 units would be $100 per unit, but they would 
be only $10 per unit if they could be amortized over 1,000,000 units. In that 
case, a group of competing firms that shared the technology via a pool or 
other licensing arrangement could produce at a far lower cost than if each 
firm had to develop its own technology individually. 
One would expect to see more use of licensing, including pools, as 
production economies of scale are modest. In such cases, production econ-
omies of scale suggest the viability of small firms, while the sharing of 
technology serves to reduce input costs over the entire market. For exam-
ple, a patent pool covering an automobile production system would have a 
small number of firms because economies of scale in auto production, 
which is rivalrous, generally dictate that the producers of the vehicles them-
selves be very large. In contrast, the patent pool covering MPEG-2 video 
technology includes some 1,400 firms making a wide variety of devices that 
produce, store, or display video in MPEG formats.33 A blanket licensing 
agreement for music performance rights, such as Broadcast Music, Inc., 
includes more than 7 million songs representing some half-million artists.34 
This is because the economies at the licensing level favor a very compre-
hensive licensing library, while at the production level most bands or or-
chestras record fewer than a half-dozen songs per year. 
Third, a common feature of technology is an increased need for in-
teroperability. The need tends to be greatest in markets for information 
technologies such as telecommunications and Internet technology, as well 
as computer hardware and software. It is less pronounced in markets such 
as pharmaceuticals and chemicals.35 As noted before, the fact that an indus-
try is a network does not dictate monopoly, and competitive networks can 
be made to function quite effectively. For example, the economic perfor-
mance of the telephone industry improved significantly when we realized 
that, while we needed universal protocols for interconnection and compati-
bility, the actual production of the various segments, such as instruments 
  
 33 See MPEG-2 Licenses, MPEG LA, http://www.mpegla.com/main/programs/M2/Pages/
Licensees.aspx (last visited July 14, 2012) (listing 1,424 licensees and affiliates in the MPEG-2 pool). 
The patents cover technologies for video and audio representation and compression for use on electronic 
storage media such as hard drives or flash cards. 
 34 See About BMI, http://www.bmi.com/about/entry/538061 (last visited July 11, 2012); see also 
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 1 (1979). 
 35 Setting aside genetic patents, where multiple complementary licenses may be necessary for 
research. See Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310 
SCIENCE 239, 239 (2005); see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998); Courtney C. 
Scala, Making the Jump from Gene Pools to Patent Pools: How Patent Pools Can Facilitate the Devel-
opment of Pharmacogenomics, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1631, 1635 (2009). 
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and many distribution functions, could be organized competitively.36 The 
real problem with the Telecommunications Act of 199637 is not that it failed 
to recognize the value of competition. Rather, its global interconnection 
obligations extend even to portions of the market that could otherwise be 
structured quite competitively without any need to share productive assets.38 
To the extent that the Act gives small firms a right to share assets that could 
readily be produced competitively, it hinders rather than furthers develop-
ment.39 
Fourth, to the extent that separately owned intellectual property rights 
function as complements, sharing is often the best way to achieve efficient 
production. This fact is not very different in principle from the situation of 
any producer who procures complementary goods from other firms. For 
example, an automobile may have 5,000 complementary parts. A large au-
tomobile manufacturer such as Ford will manufacture some of these and 
purchase others depending on the relative payoff. The unification of com-
plementary patents into a single product largely follows the same course. If 
a firm has its own best technology for some components, it will employ it. 
If its technology is inferior for other components or if it has no technology 
for them at all, it will license from others. The line of equipoise represents 
the difference between the cost of internal IP ownership and the cost of IP 
licensing from outside. For this reason, the attitude of the antitrust laws 
toward patent pooling is justifiably more tolerant when the shared patents 
are complements rather than substitutes.40 This explains why an often given 
justification for certain patent pools is that they involve “blocking” patents, 
which are patents whose claims conflict with one another such that one 
cannot be practiced without infringing the other.41 
Patent blocking relationships are complementary with respect to the 
particular claims that block, although the patents may be substitutes with 
respect to other claims. For example, the prolonged Philips/Princo42 litiga-
  
 36 See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, ¶¶ 785-87; see also SPULBER & YOO, supra 
note 19, at 233-48. 
 37 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 38 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2006) (originally enacted as Pub. L. 104-104, § 251, 110 Stat. 56, 62 
(1996)). 
 39 See id. § 251(b). 
 40 Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution, 2004 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 3, ¶¶ 13-25 (2004). 
 41 See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (asserting 
blocking as rationale for pooling); Int’l Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1964) 
(holding that it was permissible for firm to tie blocking patents); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of 
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1009-10 (1997); Josh Lerner & Jean 
Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691 (2004); Robert Merges, Intellectual Proper-
ty Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 80 (1994).  
 42 Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 2480 (2011).  
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tion involved patents with blocking claims even though the technologies in 
the underlying patents were substitutes.43 One technology covered an analog 
method of locating the writing point on a rewritable optical disc, while the 
other technology covered a digital method for doing the same thing.44 Alt-
hough a licensee would use one technology or the other, indicating that the 
patents were primarily substitutes rather than complements, at least one 
claim in the digital patent was thought to block the analog technology.45 
Pooling of complementary patents can also address double marginali-
zation problems when licenses must otherwise be obtained from separate 
sources. Double marginalization occurs when separate firms selling com-
plementary products each have some market power, are unable to pool their 
output, and each assesses a profit-maximizing output rate individually.46 
Under quite robust assumptions, the profit-maximizing output is higher if a 
single firm offers the complements together or the two firms can coordinate 
their output by licensing together.47 The benefit accrues both to consumers 
in the form of lower prices, and to producers in the form of higher output. 
Eliminating double marginalization explains many instances of tying and 
also of the kind of joint licensing that can result from pooling arrange-
ments.48 
  
 43 Id. at 1323, 1326. 
 44 Id. at 1322. 
 45 Id., where the pooled patents provided alternative digital and analogue solutions to a problem, 
but at least one claim in the digital patent blocked the technology described by the analogue patent; cf. 
Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co., 204 F. 597 (W.D.N.Y. 1913), aff’d, 211 F. 654 (2d Cir. 1914), where 
the Wright patent described “wing warp,” which stabilized and steered a plane by twisting flexible 
wings. The Curtiss technology used hinged ailerons at the trailing edge of rigid wings that could be 
made of metal. Id. at 606. The two technologies were substitutes in that a manufacturer would choose 
one or the other but not both. Nevertheless, the Curtiss technology was found to infringe the Wright 
patent under a broad reading of the doctrine of equivalents, thus rendering the patents blocking. Id. at 
614; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.5 (1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/0558.pdf (providing an example and analysis of cross-licensing and blocking patents); 
2 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED 
TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 34.2c, at 34-7 (Supp. 2011). 
 46 W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 238-39 (4th ed. 2005). 
 47 See id. at 238-41 (describing and analyzing a “classic” case of vertical integration); JEAN 
TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 174-75 (1988) (describing double marginalization 
of complements). 
 48 See Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 
ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 959 (2010) (explaining how tying can eliminate double marginalization); Mark A. 
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2013-14 (2007) 
(describing the relationship between double marginalization and complementary patents). For the rele-
vant mathematical analysis, see Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements, in 
OXFORD INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1999063.  
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But in today’s patent world these reasons for cross licensing or other 
pooling arrangements are hardly the whole story. Economies of scale, inter-
connectivity, and complementarity explain only a portion of the procompet-
itive rationale for pooling. A great deal of pooling in many markets, par-
ticularly those for information and electronic technologies, is a function of 
boundary defects in the patent system. Many patents cover only trivial ad-
vances over prior art, thus chopping property rights into tiny pieces. Claims 
are often drafted in overly broad ways, often designed to obfuscate rather 
than clarify the rights they create.49 The problem is particularly serious in 
electronic and information technologies. When the costs of identifying and 
defending individual boundaries are high in relation to the costs of sharing, 
firms will develop communal systems for organizing their production. 
The problem of many patents is ambiguous and involves potentially 
overlapping coverage, making patent boundaries very costly to defend.50 
Many patent pools were formed only after years of costly patent infringe-
ment litigation, which the pool finally settled.51 Litigation is nothing other 
than the cost of identifying and defending boundaries, and when these costs 
become too high in relation to the costs of joint administration, then pooling 
begins to make more economic sense. Given the ubiquity of patent bounda-
ry problems in certain market areas, this rationale for pooling applies when 
patents are substitutes as well as when they are complements. It also applies 
in markets in which interconnectivity and compatibility needs are not par-
ticularly high. 
  
 49 See generally BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at chs. 4, 5 & 12. 
 50 The Supreme Court recently observed the problem in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 (2012) (“‘One problem with [process] patents is that the more ab-
stractly their claims are stated, the more difficult it is to determine precisely what they cover. They risk 
being applied to a wide range of situations that were not anticipated by the patentee.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 112)). 
 51 See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Grp., Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 54 (1973) (patent pool to resolve 
litigation between firms owning alternative technologies); United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 
174,177-78 (1963) (settlement agreement involved pooling plus exclusion); United States v. New Wrin-
kle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 373-74 (1952) (cross licensing with price restrictions); Hartford-Empire Co. v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 386, 394-95, clarified by 324 U.S. 570 (1945) (horizontal customer restrictions); 
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 268-69, 271 (1942) (cross licensing with price re-
strictions); Noll v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., 467 F.2d 295, 297 (6th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (conveyance 
of disputed patent to trustee to licensee out); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 
675 (D.S.C. 1977), aff’d in relevant part, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 
227 F. Supp. 791, 797-98 (E.D. Mich. 1964), aff'd by an equally divided court, 382 U.S. 197 (1965) 
(settlement included cross licensing with price restrictions); see also 12 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046 (3d ed. 2012); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: 
Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, 1 
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 142-44 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).  
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B. Output and Access Restrictions 
Some pools are nothing more than fronts for collusion. Others may 
have justifications but simultaneously create opportunities for unreasonable 
output restrictions. Most of the patent pooling arrangements that have been 
condemned under the antitrust laws involved explicit restraints on price or 
output that may or may not have been necessary to the proper functioning 
of the pool.52 Further, most of these restraints operated in the product mar-
ket rather than the market for the patent rights themselves, including such 
things as resale price maintenance, territorial or product market divisions, 
or price fixing of product output.53 
Commons for rivalrous goods such as grazing rights or fisheries could 
not survive without limiting output. The classical “tragedy” of the com-
mons is that when participants do not bear the full cost of their use, they 
will use too much because excessive use without maintenance reduces their 
own short-run costs.54 Even the common law recognized this and created 
rules that required joint operation in cases where a resource was shared but 
no stated limit was placed on each person’s rights.55 In pools for rivalrous 
goods, restrictions are essential limitations on the overuse of commons ca-
pacity and not intended to cartelize markets. This is evidenced by the fact 
that the vast majority of rivalrous commons are very small in relation to the 
market in which their production is sold, meaning that output collusion is 
not a likely explanation for the output restriction. Even a very large com-
mons for grazing on a common pasture or taking fish out of a common 
pond would produce only a miniscule share of the market for these particu-
lar commodities, which are typically sold in a much larger market than is 
encompassed by the pool.56 As a result, there should not be any presumption 
  
 52 See infra note 53.  
 53 E.g., New Wrinkle, 342 U.S. at 378 (patent pooling agreements not to compete violate antitrust 
laws); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 312-15 (1948) (price fixing illegal where two 
patentees cross license each other’s patents); Hartford-Empire, 323 U.S. at 413-18 (a cartel may be 
forced to license pooled patents to competitors for a reasonable royalty); Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2480 (2011) (horizon-
tal agreement between pool licensors did not violate antitrust laws); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 
Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) (noncompete agreement between name-brand and generic 
drug manufacturers was not per se illegal); see 12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 51, at ¶¶ 2041-
44. 
 54 See Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). For more tech-
nical treatment, see Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Property Rights, in HANDBOOK OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2012). 
 55 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 326-29. 
 56 One cannot rule out the possibility of monopsony power in small local markets. For example, 
fishermen might join together to lease fishing rights in a local lake, creating a bilateral monopoly or 
giving them the power to suppress the price. See Seth Korman, International Management of a High 
Seas Fishery: Political and Property-Rights Solutions and the Atlantic Bluefin, 51 VA. J. INT’L. L. 697, 
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that an output restriction asserted by those managing a commons for a rival-
rous good is anticompetitive. 
Nonrivalrous goods such as patents are different, however. On the 
supply side, each producer can use a shared patent as much as it pleases 
without limiting the amount available for others to use. Further, a great 
many patent pools, including many that the Supreme Court has considered, 
appeared to include firms that collectively represented a significant portion 
of the output market.57 As a result, production increases by one firm can 
impose costs on other members of the pool; however, these are the costs 
that we ordinarily associate with competition. That is, if you and I are fel-
low members in a patent pool, your output increase may force me to charge 
a lower price for my product. In an unrestrained pool for a fungible product, 
firms behaving competitively would increase their output to the competitive 
level. The principal value of output limitations in pools for nonrivalrous 
goods such as patents is that they enable firms to earn higher returns on 
their output. 
Of course, if a single firm owned all of the patents in question, it 
would be able to reduce output to a level that reflects whatever market 
power it has. At the other extreme, royalty-free cross licensing without any 
restrictions could yield the competitive rate of output. So how should anti-
trust policy decide the appropriate level of restraint in a case such as, say, 
Bement v. National Harrow Co.,58 in which cross-licensing patentees of 
agricultural harrows fixed the minimum price at which the harrows were to 
be sold?59 
Antitrust’s rule of reason should be applied to legitimately ancillary 
restraints, which may include market divisions, concerted refusals to deal, 
and sometimes even price restraints. Our premise in using the rule of rea-
son, however, is to seek out restraints that tend to increase output by reduc-
ing costs or improving product quality.60 The purpose of the rule of reason 
  
731-33 (2011) (suggesting such a monopsony in the market for Atlantic Bluefin fishing rights); Fred O. 
Boadu, Bruce M. McCarl & Dhazn Gillig, An Empirical Investigation of Institutional Change in 
Groundwater Management in Texas: The Edwards Aquifer Case, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 117, 120-22 
(2007) (similar; water rights). 
 57 Litigated pools which appear to have had dominant or at least significant market shares include 
United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 176 (1963) (sole remaining domestic producer of zigzag 
sewing machines for household use); New Wrinkle, 342 U.S. at 373-74; Line Material, 333 U.S. at 290 
(40.77% of all cutouts manufactured and sold by defendant were produced under the patents at issue); 
United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 339 (1947); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 
226 U.S. 20, 35 (1912); Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 88 (1902); Keeler v. Standard Fold-
ing Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 660 (1895); In re Gypsum Antitrust Cases, 565 F.2d 1123, 1124 (9th Cir. 
1977); United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541, 550 (N.D. Ohio 1942), modified by 323 
U.S. 386 (1945). 
 58 186 U.S. 70 (1902).  
 59 Id. at 72. 
 60 E.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979); Princo Corp. v. 
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 
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is not to identify the “correct” amount of monopoly return that the members 
in a patent pool should be earning. 
In any event, product differentiation in the output market will typically 
be sufficient to eliminate the problem of returns that are driven to short-run 
marginal cost. This is particularly likely to be true if the pooled technology 
is a relatively minor component in the overall value of the output product. 
For example, numerous digital camera manufacturers, including large ones 
such as Kodak, Panasonic, and Canon, are in the MPEG LA licensee pool 
for video compression technology.61 But these firms make highly distin-
guishable cameras with different features, performance capabilities, and 
pricing that ranges from below $100 to several thousand dollars. As a re-
sult, each firm in the pool is very likely able to charge prices higher than 
short-run marginal cost.62 Further, the MPEG royalty runs from approxi-
mately $2 per unit, or typically not more than 1 percent of the product’s 
retail price.63 Cross-licensing pools for undifferentiated products sold under 
highly competitive conditions are rare or perhaps nonexistent.64  
In both its Bement and 1926 United States v. General Electric Co.65 
decisions, the Supreme Court indicated that the members of a patent pool 
should be entitled to set the product price.66 The apparent rationale was that 
the protections given by the patent laws are intended to meter the correct 
amount of innovation, and an explicit cartel selects the same output and 
price as a single firm.67 As a result, a group of patentees and licensees 
  
547 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 2008); see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶ 2043 (Supp. 2012). 
 61 See MPEG-2 Licensees, supra note 33. 
 62 Both monopolistically competitive markets, which are characterized by low entry barriers, and 
oligopolistic product-differentiated markets can have equilibria that accommodate significant fixed 
costs. See Michael Spence, Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 217, 234 (1976). In general, higher fixed costs are associated with a greater degree of 
differentiation and a smaller number of firms that the market is able to support. See Avinash K. Dixit, 
Some Reflections on Theories and Applications of Monopolistic Competition, in THE MONOPOLISTIC 
COMPETITION REVOLUTION IN RESTROSPECT 123, 129-30 (Steven Brakman & Ben J. Heijdra eds., 
2004); JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS WITH CALCULUS 485-86 
(2008). In the pure Chamberlin model, easy entry price is at average total cost, which includes fixed as 
well as variable costs. For a graphic illustration, see Craig Marcott, Cost and Revenue for Monopoly and 
Monopolistic Competition, WOLFRAM DEMONSTRATIONS PROJECT, http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/
CostAndRevenueForMonopolyAndMonopolisticCompetition (last visited July 14, 2012). 
 63 See MPEG-2 License Agreement Summary, MPEG LA, http://www.mpegla.com/main/
programs/M2/Pages/Agreement.aspx (last visited July 14, 2012) (permitting individual licensees to 
negotiate other terms). 
 64 A possible exception is patent pools for products that are essentially commodities, such as 
memory chips. 
 65 272 U.S. 476 (1926). 
 66 Id. at 488; Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 72 (1902). 
 67 Gen. Elec., 272 U.S. at 490 (“When the patentee licenses another to make and vend, and retains 
the right to continue to make and vend on his own account, the price at which his licensee will sell will 
necessarily affect the price at which he can sell his own patented goods. It would seem entirely reasona-
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should be able to set the monopoly price or output level. For example, if a 
monopolist of a patented widget would set output at 1,000 units, yielding a 
price of $10 each, then it should be able to license a group of firms and 
insist that each one charge $10 or that aggregate output be 1,000 units.68 If 
several firms own patents and engage in cross licensing, the same outcome 
should apply. 
The fallacy in this reasoning is that it confuses patent value with the 
value of collusion in the product market. The fact is that we do not know 
what the monopoly price and output would be. Permitting the firms to col-
lude on product price effectively predicates the value of the entire cartel 
markup to the patents, when in fact the value of patents on product prices 
can range from very substantial to virtually nil. This is particularly true 
when patents are either relatively minor or of dubious value.69 For example, 
I might own a perfectly valid patent for a relatively minor improvement in 
  
ble that he should say to the licensee, ‘Yes, you may make and sell articles under my patent, but not so 
as to destroy the profit that I wish to obtain by making them and selling them myself.’ He does not 
thereby sell outright to the licensee the articles the latter may make and sell, or vest absolute ownership 
in them. He restricts the property and interest the licensee has in the goods he makes and proposes to 
sell.”). 
 68 See Bement, 186 U.S. at 91-93 (“On looking through these licenses we have been unable to find 
any conditions contained therein rendering the agreement void because of a violation of that act. There 
had been, as the referee finds, a large amount of litigation between the many parties claiming to own 
various patents covering these implements. Suits for infringements and for injunction had been frequent, 
and it was desirable to prevent them in the future. This execution of these contracts did in fact settle a 
large amount of litigation regarding the validity of many patents as found by the referee. This was a 
legitimate and desirable result in itself. The provision in regard to the price at which the licensee would 
sell the article manufactured under the license was also an appropriate and reasonable condition. It 
tended to keep up the price of the implements manufactured and sold, but that was only recognizing the 
nature of the property dealt in, and providing for its value so far as possible. This the parties were legal-
ly entitled to do. The owner of a patented article can, of course, charge such price as he may choose, and 
the owner of a patent may assign it or sell the right to manufacture and sell the article patented upon the 
condition that the assignee shall charge a certain amount for such article.”); Gen. Elec., 272 U.S. at 490 
(“The patentee may make and grant a license to another to make and use the patented articles, but with-
hold his right to sell them. . . . If the patentee goes further, and licenses the selling of the articles, may he 
limit the selling by limiting the method of sale and the price? We think he may do so, provided the 
conditions of sale are normally and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee’s 
monopoly. One of the valuable elements of the exclusive right of a patentee is to acquire profit by the 
price at which the article is sold. The higher the price, the greater the profit, unless it is prohibitory. 
When the patentee licenses another to make and vend, and retains the right to continue to make and 
vend on his own account, the price at which his licensee will sell will necessarily affect the price at 
which he can sell his own patented goods. It would seem entirely reasonable that he should say to the 
licensee, ‘Yes, you may make and sell articles under my patent, but not so as to destroy the profit that I 
wish to obtain by making them and selling them myself.’ He does not thereby sell outright to the licen-
see the articles the latter may make and sell, or vest absolute ownership in them. He restricts the proper-
ty and interest the licensee has in the goods he makes and proposes to sell.”). 
 69 See, e.g., Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121-22 (1884) (refusing to allow the entire value of 
the mop as damages in a case involving patent infringement of a relatively minor patent for a device that 
clamped the mop to the handle). 
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an office stapler’s ability to reduce jamming. You might own a relatively 
minor but valid patent that enables the stapler to be loaded more easily. 
Each patent might in a competitive stapler market add $0.25 to the value of 
a stapler. But if we collectively controlled the entire market we might fix 
the price of the staplers at $3 above the competitive price. Or, to say this 
somewhat differently, price fixing and output allocation agreements in pa-
tent pools effectively permit the firms to attribute the entire value of the 
cartel markup on the finished product to the patents in question. The Be-
ment decision effectively did that.70 A market division agreement could do 
the same thing to the extent that it gave each firm a protected area (in geo-
graphic or product space) in which it had market power. 
Naked restraints such as price fixing in the product market tend to 
move the price from the pre-restraint level toward the monopoly level, quite 
aside from the value of any patent licenses that might be involved. A patent 
confers such power only rarely. For that reason, the principle established in 
Bement and General Electric seems wrong even aside from questions about 
patent validity. Indeed, if all harrow manufacturers were involved in the 
pool, the price fix would yield the same price and output whether or not the 
patents had any value. The price would be lower only to the extent that pa-
tent invalidity known to outsiders increased the threat of entry. 
C. Pooling Worthless Patents 
The discussion to this point assumes that pooling involves valid pa-
tents with positive value. Patents of dubious validity increase the likelihood 
that a pool is being used as a screen for collusion. But there is another ex-
planation for pools that applies quite aside from questions of validity. This 
explanation largely cuts across both substitutes and complements and can 
apply to markets that do not exhibit a significant need for cross-product 
connectivity or compatibility. Often patents are pooled because the problem 
of identifying and defending their boundaries is so significant that the pa-
tents are worthless or—as Professors James Bessen and Michael Meurer 
suggest—may even have negative value, even though they are perfectly 
valid as patents under existing patent doctrine.71 
Suppose that a patent thicket in a certain market results in widespread 
infringement litigation, a common occurrence in the history of patent pools. 
The patents are minor and/or difficult to interpret, creating significant 
boundary problems that result in costly claim construction proceedings. In 
many areas, but particularly in information technologies, the costs of ob-
taining and later defending or enforcing these patents may be greater than 
  
 70 Bement, 186 U.S. at 93-95. 
 71 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND 
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 141 (2008). 
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the value that the patents add to the products in question.72 Indeed, licensees 
have been heard to complain that it is difficult and costly for them even to 
determine which patents in a pool are necessary to their production.73 Often 
these pools contain thousands of patents, only a few of which may be “es-
sential” for a licensee’s product.74 The patents themselves are, of course, 
public records; the principal problem lies in identifying the relevant ones 
and interpreting them.75 In such situations, royalty-free cross licensing can 
  
 72 Id. at 140-42. 
 73 E.g., Nero AG v. MPEG LA, L.L.C., No. 10-CV-3672-MRP-RZ, 2010 WL 4366448, at *2 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010) (noting plaintiff’s allegation that it “would be prohibitively time-consuming 
and expensive” for it to determine which of 800 patents in a pool were essential to its technology).  
 74 See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-CV-178-BBC, 2011 WL 7324582, at *11 
(W.D. Wis. June 7, 2011) (containing allegation that Motorola failed to disclose patents that it stated 
were essential to smartphone technology); Nero AG v. MPEG LA, L.L.C., No. 10-CV-3672-MRP-RZ, 
2010 WL 4878835, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010) (rejecting licensee’s antitrust complaint that MPEG 
added “hundreds” of nonessential patents and noting that MPEG charged prospective licensees $8,500 
per patent to determine which patents were essential to the licensee’s technology); cf. Barnes & Noble, 
Inc. v. LSI Corp., No. C-11-2709-EMC, 2012 WL 359713, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2012) (finding as a 
preliminary matter that there was a duty to disclose patents created by membership in standard setting 
organization); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2011 WL 4948567, at *4-6 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011) (rejecting for pleading defects an antitrust claim that firm failed to disclose 
essential patents to standard setting organization and failed to abide by reasonable license terms); Vizio, 
Inc. v. Funai Elec. Co., No. CV-09-0174-AHM, 2010 WL 7762624, at *4-7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010) 
(dismissing part and sustaining part of antitrust claim against firm that allegedly reneged on commit-
ment to license essential patents on fair and reasonable terms). On the meaning of “essential” patents, 
see Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. Cinram Int’l Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 735, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 75 See, e.g., Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Hyundai Elecs. Indus., 49 F. Supp. 2d 893, 901 (E.D. Tex. 
1999) (“The product in question would have to be examined in detail and compared to the elements of 
the claims of the patent in question. Depending on the type of product, this product examination could 
take several months and costs tens of thousands of dollars—all to evaluate a single product against a 
single patent. For parties with large semiconductor patent portfolios like Texas Instruments and Hyun-
dai, what is the solution? Enter the patent portfolio cross-license agreement. The portfolio license is 
widely used in the semiconductor industry because it is almost impossible on a patent-by-patent, coun-
try-by-country, product-by-product basis to determine whether someone is using a company’s patents in 
a given country and provide protection for patents not yet issued. First, under a patent-specific license 
agreement, the parties have an extremely difficult time tracking the sales that should be included in the 
royalty base. This difficulty arises from the fact that the holder of a patent is entitled to receive royalties 
for items sold both directly and indirectly into the country where the patent exists. Parties to license 
agreements track indirect sales in order to receive full and fair value for their patents. If parties look 
only at direct sales, they are not receiving fair value for their patents. Tracking sales that come into a 
specific country is exceedingly difficult, for the party trying to track indirect sales has to know not only 
where the other party is selling its products, but also the identity of the purchasers in order to determine 
the likelihood that those products would come into a country where the other party has patents. Second, 
worldwide license rights are necessary in the semiconductor market because the semiconductor market 
is a worldwide market. Companies in the semiconductor market do not have the luxury of selling only in 
one country. Third, for parties with large patent portfolios like Texas Instruments and Hyundai, it is 
impossible to examine the entire portfolio on a patent-by-patent, country-by-country basis for all possi-
ble products. Finally, it is impossible to determine whether a specific product is ‘covered by’ a patent 
without litigation. By using this expansive cross-license agreement mechanism—the portfolio license—
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profit the participants by bringing the value of patents up to zero. Under the 
agreement, each firm can produce freely without worrying about an in-
fringement suit from other pool members. That is, the pool effectively 
backs its participants out of a patent system that is harmful to them, at least 
with respect to rights among themselves. 
The value of the patent system will still be impaired, however, to the 
extent that the pool needs to defend itself against patentees who are not 
members of the pool, and in particular nonpracticing entities. Conversely, 
patents held by pool members may still have some value against nonmem-
bers of the pool, particularly those nonmembers that do not own patents. 
They will have to defend their own technology from the pool’s infringe-
ment suits. As a result, they will have an incentive either to join the pool or 
to acquire their own patents of negative value, for no other reason than to 
provide an offset and induce the pool members to bring them into the pool 
as well. Thus, firms develop “defensive” patenting strategies of acquiring 
patent portfolios, not to practice or license out, but rather as bargaining 
chips in the event of infringement suits.76 
The social costs of this collection of practices are substantial. First are 
the significant costs of operating an economically useless system for acquir-
ing the patent rights in the first place. The cost is not only the negative val-
ue of the patents, but also the considerable administrative costs of creating 
and litigating them. Then are the significant costs of creating and operating 
a pool that is designed, to the extent feasible, to reverse the consequences of 
overpatenting. In short, often firms can profit by “contracting out” of the 
patent system, so to speak, by entering into cross-licensing agreements that 
reduce or even eliminate the opportunities under which they will assert pa-
tent infringement claims against one another.77  
Fundamentally, these are not so much antitrust problems as they are 
problems of regulatory design. Large numbers of negative value patents 
reflect a serious problem in the patent system, but participants in such in-
dustries must take the system as they find it. Fixing the patent system is not 
antitrust’s purpose or legitimate enterprise. 
A related problem concerns single firms that fail to give other mem-
bers of a pool adequate and timely notice of patent rights. This often occurs 
in the context of standard setting in IP-intensive areas. The courts have not 
been particularly helpful because they get the notice problem precisely 
backwards. As a general proposition, the cost of giving notice is much 
smaller than the cost of searching through a large number of records. For 
  
mammoth companies in the semiconductor industry like Texas Instruments and Hyundai avoid the 
costly and inefficient endeavor of a patent-by-patent licensing scheme.”). 
 76 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 6-7, 33-36, 52-55 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/
innovationrpt.pdf. 
 77 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 341-44. 
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this reason, the real property system requires landowners to record their 
interests in such a manner that landowners whose rights are affected will be 
able to find them. Further, as a general proposition, the less tangible the 
interest, the more subsequent developers need to rely on the record. Never-
theless, the D.C. and Federal Circuits have held that a patentee did not vio-
late a disclosure duty because a standard-setting organization in which the 
patentee was participating failed to assess disclosure of patents as a re-
quirement of membership.78 The correct rule should be that a patentee al-
ways has a duty to disclose its patents relevant to standard setting in which 
the patentee is involved, and the penalty for not doing so is loss of en-
forcement rights vis-à-vis the members of that organization for any actions 
taken prior to the time adequate notice is given.79 To return to the real prop-
erty analogy, if a group of landowners were contemplating a common de-
velopment, we would not rely on the group’s “notice policy” in order to 
determine whether one member could later assert a preexisting nondevel-
opment covenant against the others. It could do so only if the covenant were 
properly recorded in a manner such that a reasonable title search would 
have found it or if the other members had actual notice. The reasons for 
applying such a rule in patent law are much, much greater than they are in 
real property. 
D. Tying and Foreclosure 
Package licenses can present opportunities for anticompetitive foreclo-
sure, which, in the case of pooled patents, may also facilitate collusion. 
Strictly speaking, a “pool” is a set of patentees who cross license—that is, 
who license their respective patents to one another. By contrast, a “package 
license” is an arrangement in which multiple patents are grouped into a 
single package for licensing purposes, and typically the licensor(s) either 
refuses to license the patents individually or else will do so only at a higher 
royalty rate. As an antitrust matter, this gives package licenses some of the 
same attributes as tying arrangements. For example, the Patent Misuse Re-
form Act combines the two by speaking of a patent owner who “condi-
tion[s] the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented 
product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or pur-
chase of a separate product.”80 That is to say, both ties of patent and product 
or ties of one patent to another patent are treated the same way. The statute 
  
 78 Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 467-69 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Rambus Inc. v Infineon Techs. 
AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1096-98 (Fed. Cir. 2003); accord Barnes & Noble, 2012 WL 359713, at *10; Sam-
sung Elecs., 2011 WL 4948567, at *5. 
 79 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Response, Notice and Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 
221, 230-33 (2011). 
 80 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2006). 
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goes on to state that such conditioning does not violate the Patent Act un-
less the seller “has market power in the relevant market for the patent or 
patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.”81 Many large 
established patent pools also engage in package licensing to outsiders. For 
example, the MPEG-2 patent pool has about thirty owner-cross licensors, 
who in turn license to about 1,500 manufacturing licensees of the MPEG 
package.82 
In package licensing, anticompetitive foreclosure can occur because li-
censees of a pool can use any patent within the pool at a marginal cost of 
zero. For example, once a licensee obtains rights to a package of patents A, 
B, C . . . n, the C patent has already been bought and paid for. A rival might 
have a patent covering an alternative technology, C’, which it would like to 
sell to this licensee and the licensee may prefer it. However, it is hard to 
compete with a price of zero. As a result, including C in the pool can have 
the effective result of excluding technology C’.83 This could operate as ei-
ther a price restraint to the extent that it removes C’ from competition, or 
else as a restraint on innovation to the extent that it excludes a superior 
technology from the market. 
This problem is fundamentally different, however, from the problem 
of the licensee who claims that a particular patent is merely unnecessary to 
its production.84 The latter problem is simply a complaint that the licensee 
would like to have a smaller package than the one that is offered. But the 
transaction costs of identifying the precise coverage of numerous patents, as 
well as the costs of individually tailoring packages to cover the needs of 
diverse licensees are considerable, to say nothing of monitoring costs to 
determine that the licensees are in fact using only the patents that they li-
censed.85 As a result, the claim that a package contains a merely “unwant-
ed” patent is meaningless as far as competition policy is concerned. 
Antitrust claims to the effect that packages contain unwanted patents 
should be limited to situations in which the licensee can point to a specific 
technological alternative that is foreclosed by the package in question. Rec-
ognizing an antitrust right for tying of a patent that is merely “unwanted” 
  
 81 Id. 
 82 See MPEG-2 Licensors, MPEG LA, http://www.mpegla.com/main/programs/M2/Pages/
Licensors.aspx (last visited July 14, 2012); MPEG-2 Licensees, supra note 33. 
 83 Of course, it will not exclude C’ if the incremental value that the licensee places on C’ over C 
exceeds the price of C’. 
 84 See, e.g., U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1187-90 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(permitting package licensing agreement including both essential and nonessential patents because it did 
not bar the licensee from using alternative technologies); Nero AG v. MPEG LA, L.L.C., No. 10-CV-
3672-MRP-RZ, 2010 WL 4878835, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010) (rejecting claim that MPEG pool 
violated antitrust laws because it included unnecessary patents). 
 85 Cf. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 762-63, 767-68 (D. Del. 1981) 
(rejecting tying challenge by bar that wished to license only country and western songs from blanket 
licensing arrangement); see also BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 345-47. 
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reverts to the discredited “leverage” theory, which posits that a firm can 
obtain additional monopoly profits by tying goods that the purchaser would 
otherwise not want or that would be available at the competitive price.86 
Increasingly, antitrust tying law recognizes the objections to leverage doc-
trine by denying relief to those claiming merely that a tied product is un-
wanted, without identifying actual foreclosure of rivals.87 
Further, while identification of a foreclosed rival technology is a nec-
essary condition of competitive harm, it is not a sufficient condition. For 
example, the inclusion of patent C in the previous example would be justi-
fied, notwithstanding the availability of a rival’s patent C’, if patent C in 
fact blocked some other patent(s) in the licensor’s pool. In that case, the 
licensee would have to get a license to the C patent in any event. Of course, 
the fact that a blocking patent must be licensed does not entail that it must 
be practiced. The licensee would still be free in that case to license the C’ 
patent separately at whatever fee it can negotiate. 
II. EXCLUSION AND REFUSAL TO LICENSE IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY 
MARKETS 
Under U.S. antitrust law, no firm, not even a monopolist, has a general 
duty to share inputs or product output with rivals.88 The Supreme Court 
stated this proposition very forcefully in Verizon Communications Inc. v. 
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,89 which leaves very little room for a 
dealing duty imposed by the antitrust laws.90 The Court also recognized one 
exception two decades earlier in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Ski-
ing Corp.:91 once a firm has voluntarily begun a cooperative venture with a 
rival, it may have a duty not to terminate such a venture without good rea-
son.92 The extent to which this duty survives Trinko remains to be seen.93 In 
  
 86 Richard S. Markovits, Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory Part II: Tie-Ins, Leverage, 
and the American Antitrust Laws, 80 YALE L.J. 195, 197-98 (1970). 
 87 See Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2012); 9 PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1724 (3d ed. 2010). 
 88 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
 89 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 90 Id. at 410; accord Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 452 (2009). In 
patents, see Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 91 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
 92 Id. at 610-11; see also Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408-09 (explaining the Aspen holding). 
 93 Cf. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 36, available at 
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any event, to say that a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to deal with a rival is 
per se lawful may be an overstatement, but only a modest one. 
The same rules largely apply to intellectual property rights. As a gen-
eral proposition, the owner of a patent or copyright has no duty to license it 
to a rival or anyone else. Section 271(d) of the Patent Act provides that a 
refusal to license is not “misuse” or “illegal extension” of a patent.94 The 
latter phrase can be read to suggest that a refusal to license cannot be an 
antitrust violation either, and in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, 
Inc.,95 the Supreme Court appeared to read it that way in the context of ty-
ing arrangements.96 Copyright law does not have a similar provision, but the 
case law strongly disfavors the use of antitrust law to recognize dealing 
obligations that the Copyright Act itself does not create.97 
One difference between refusals to share ordinary productive assets 
and refusals to share IP rights is that ordinary productive assets can typical-
ly be replicated by others. For example, if I own a pipeline or factory and 
refuse to share it, rivals can generally build their own alternative pipelines 
or factories and the market will be more competitive. Indeed, one of the 
reasons we sometimes think of the essential facility doctrine in antitrust as 
anticompetitive is that it permits rivals to piggyback on the dominant firm’s 
productive assets when the market would actually be more competitive if 
rivals were given the incentive to develop competing assets on their own.98 
But intellectual property rights can be different. Most particularly, a 
patent gives a right to the technology that it covers and makes it unlawful 
for rivals to duplicate that technology, even if they do so on their own. In-
deed, the exclusion is absolute even if rivals make all of the investment in 
development themselves because they do not know about the dominant 
  
 94 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006). 
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firm’s patents. So if I own a patented process for manufacturing widgets, 
the consequence of my refusal to share is not simply that rivals are forced to 
develop the process on their own. They may be disabled from developing 
the process at all, even if they have no knowledge about how my process 
works. Patent infringement does not require copying or even subjective 
knowledge of another’s technology, and only a miniscule number of patent 
infringement suits even find that copying occurred.99 Copyright law also 
prohibits firms from replicating a copyrighted work, although it does re-
quire copying.100 
The lack of a copying requirement in patent law can be quite harmful 
if patents are routinely granted on minor or obvious inventions that would 
have been produced by numerous rivals under ordinary competitive pro-
cesses.101 The combination of trivial patents and a no-duty-to-license rule 
can result in the creation of monopoly in situations that do nothing to incen-
tivize innovation and where competition could otherwise have been ex-
pected to emerge. 
But patent law goes even further. The rule that a patentee has no duty 
to license obtains even if the dominant firm is not practicing the patent that 
the outsider needs.102 In 1908, the Supreme Court established this principle 
in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,103 which held that 
a dominant firm could prevent a rival’s use of alternative technology even if 
(1) the dominant firm was not using the patent that covered this technology, 
but was using other technology; (2) the dominant firm had acquired the 
patent in question from another firm precisely for the purpose of denying 
access to rivals; and (3) the infringement occurred only under a broad claim 
construction under the patent doctrine of equivalents.104 In this particular 
case the infringement defendant’s technology was, in fact, quite distinct 
  
 99 See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 
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from that described in the unused patent held by the dominant firm, but the 
Court permitted a very broad claim construction that found infringement.105 
Without undermining the general no-duty-to-share principle, patent 
and antitrust law could be tweaked a good deal so as to facilitate innovation 
competition. First is the issue of acquired versus internally developed pa-
tents. Paper Bag effectively permitted a dominant firm to buy up alternative 
technologies and shut them down, denying access to rivals even though the 
acquired patent was not being used by anyone.106 One might be tempted to 
say that if the acquired patent really were superior to the dominant firm’s 
technology, then the dominant firm would use it; if it is inferior, little harm 
is done. But this approach ignores the significance of path dependence and 
uncertainty in the process of technological development. An incumbent 
firm may not switch even to a superior technology if the costs of extraction 
from existing technology are substantial, and in markets that are subject to 
monopolization this is commonly the case. New firms, by contrast, have no 
investment commitment. This explains why so many market-shifting inno-
vations come from nondominant firms.107 Dominant firms have less incen-
tive to shift technologies because they typically have a significant invest-
ment in existing technology. Further, monopoly is most likely to occur in 
markets where the costs of switching technologies are high.108 All of these 
factors tend to make alternative technologies more valuable to a monopolist 
trying to protect its investment than to prospective entrants. In sum, a dom-
inant firm stays ahead of the game either by appropriating advancing tech-
nology for itself, or else by making sure that no one else gets it. While the 
former is not of antitrust concern, the latter can be. 
The appropriate policy solution in this case is to permit dominant firms 
to acquire only nonexclusive licenses to patents that function as substitutes 
or complements to the technology in which the dominant firm has its pow-
er. A nonexclusive license gives the dominant firm what it really needs, 
which is the right to keep its own technology up to date, but not the right to 
deny access to rivals. To be sure, this rule comes with a price: it makes 
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technology developed by outsiders less valuable in cases where the tech-
nology is likely to be sold into a competitive rather than a monopolized 
market. However, nothing in the Patent Act authorizes the creation or per-
petuation of market monopolies.109 
Another approach, which is much less satisfactory, is to follow what 
many courts have done in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.110 and hold that nonpracticing entities 
are entitled only to damages rather than an injunction.111 The problem is that 
under current law the remedy might be limited to damages for past in-
fringement, but there is no guarantee that the infringer will be entitled to 
ongoing production upon payment of a judicially administered license 
fee.112 Indeed, ongoing infringement may put the infringer in the position of 
willful infringer yielding enhanced damages.113 
To summarize, a broad rule of no-duty-to-license makes sense in a re-
gime in which patents are strong and nonobvious, clearly communicate 
their coverage to others, and are actually practiced by their owners. To the 
extent that the state of patent law is deficient in these areas, however, the no 
dealing rule can serve both to perpetuate monopoly and to restrain rather 
than further innovation. In that case, antitrust can fill a gap by limiting the 
exclusionary power of acquired patents, quite consistently with the lan-
guage of the Patent Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Antitrust law was once vulnerable to the charge that it protected small-
er competitors at the expense of competition, that it was insufficiently con-
cerned with the welfare of consumers, and that it imposed high social costs 
by requiring inefficient market structures or distribution processes.114 Then 
came a twenty-five-year counterrevolution that served to realign the values 
of antitrust law with those of economic competition generally.115 To be sure, 
antitrust remains an imperfect enterprise, but it is far more defensible on 
economic grounds today than it was in the 1970s and earlier. Intellectual 
property law today is in a position similar to that occupied by antitrust sev-
eral decades ago.116 The law is far too captured by interest groups that rep-
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resent producers rather than consumers, and that profit from excessive regu-
lation in the name of IP protection.117 While antitrust policy cannot cure 
defects in the patent and copyright systems—a job that lies exclusively with 
Congress and with courts interpreting the intellectual property statutes—it 
can do a great deal to further competition in areas where the IP laws are 
silent. This is particularly likely to be true with respect to the dissemination, 
as opposed to the initial creation, of intellectual property rights. 
  
 117 See id. at 4. 
